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Foreign Corporations - Minimum Contacts - Due Process
Uppgren, an employee of the United States Department of the Interior,
was killed when the helicopter in which he was a passenger, crashed in
Minnesota. The helicopter was manufactured by the Hughes Tool Co., a
Texas corporation, with its principal place of business in California. The
aircraft was sold to the Department of Interior' by Loving Chevrolet Co.
(Loving), a Maryland corporation, with its principal place of business
in that state. The plaintiff,' asserting claims of breach of implied warranty
and negligence, brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota for the wrongful death of the deceased. The named
defendants in the action were the Hughes Tool Co., Loving Chevrolet Co.,
and Executive Aviation Services, Inc.'
Jurisdiction was obtained over defendant Loving by substituted service
of process on the Minnesota Secretary of State and notice given to the
defendant pursuant to the Minnesota "one-act" statute.' Loving moved to
quash the service asserting the same to be a denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The facts were undisputed that Loving had never "... advertised, con-
ducted any sales campaign, located any officer, agent, salesman, employee
or office in Minnesota. . . .never solicited business by mail, telephone or
otherwise ... nor ... entered into any contract or other significant legal
relationship with nor made any sale to . . ." a resident of Minnesota.! The
only contact or tie between Loving and the State of Minnesota was the
locality of the crash of the helicopter Loving sold to the Department of
Interior. Held: The single fact that a helicopter sold by a Maryland dis-
tributor caused injury in Minnesota to a resident of that state is not suffi-
cient to confer in personam jurisdiction in Minnesota over the distributor.
1 The contract for sale of the helicopter was executed in Washington, D.C. or Maryland.
'Plaintiff was duly appointed as trustee of the next of kin of the deceased to bring the wrong-
ful death action.
'Executive Aviation Services, Inc., a Maryland corporation, with its principle place of busi-
ness in Maryland, purchased defendant Loving's helicopter distributorship sometime between the
sale of the helicopter in question to the United States and the crash of the helicopter in Minnesota.
" "If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to be performed in
whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed to be
doing business in Minnesota by the foreign corporation and shall be deemed equivalent to the
appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of the state of Minnesota and his succes-
sors to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions
or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or
tort. Such process shall be served in duplicate upon the secretary of state ... and the secretary
of state shall mail one copy thereof to the corporation at its last known address. . . .The making
of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed to be the agreement of the foreign
corporation that any process against it which is so served upon the secretary of state shall be of
the same legal force and effect as if served personally within the state of Minnesota." Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 303.13(1), (3) (1957).
2 Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F.Supp. 165 (Minn. 1969).
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. C.
Minn. 1969).
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
For many years, it was thought that in personam jurisdiction could only
be obtained over a corporation in the state of its incorporation.! However,
this theory proved to be less than satisfactory from a jurisdictional point
of view as corporate activity often extended beyond the boundaries of its
creating sovereign." In the mid-nineteenth century, two theories were
developed which afforded states valid in personam jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation. The first of those theories to emerge was predicated upon
a fictional or actual "consent" of the corporation to submit to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of any state in which it did business.8 Since the permis-
sion of a state was a prerequisite to a foreign corporation's conduct of
business within that state's borders, it was thought that the permitting
sovereignty could condition its approval upon the corporation's consent to
jurisdiction. By doing business within a state, a corporation impliedly con-
sented to be sued within that state. The second theory was predicated upon
the corporation's "presence" within the forum state that would make it
amenable to suit in that state.! To be deemed present within a state, the
corporation needed only to conduct sufficient activities to be considered
"doing business" within the state. ° Since both the "consent" and the
"presence" theories were dependent upon a judicial determination that the
corporation was "doing business" within a state, doing tsiness soon be-
came a test in itself without reference to consent or presence.
There was no mechanical rule or formula as to just what activity con-
stituted "doing business," but a number of factors were considered by the
courts. Among these factors were: The amount" and continuity" of the
activity; whether or not the corporation had a local agent or office within
the forum state;" telephone listings in the forum ;14 the existence of local
bank accounts;"s and convenience of the forum and the availability of
other forums. None of these factors alone were determinative." These
factors were not uniformly used or applied. This led to inconsistent de-
cisions and a certain amount of confusion in the area. Further confusion
6 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pat.) 512 (1839).
7 However, there did appear to be a requirement that corporations organized and chartered under
the laws of the United States be sued only in the federal courts.
8 Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
' International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
'
0 Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
"See Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 133 U.S. 127 (1885).
" Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1930).
'3Star Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Red Ash Pocahontas Coal Co., 102 F.Supp. 258 (E.D. Ky. 1951).
"
4 Consolidated Cosmetics v. D-A Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951).
"5Glick v. Empire Box Corp., 119 F.Supp. 224 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
"6Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1930).
" See Richards v. North American Clay Co., 41 F.Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Action v.
Washington Times, 9 F. Supp. 74 (Md. 1934).
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arose in relation to the "drummer"'" or sales solicitation cases.19 It was held
under the "solicitation plus rule""9 that solicitation of sales alone was not
sufficient to constitute "doing business" in the forum state for jurisdictional
purposes.
II. MINIMUM CONTACTS-"DOING BUSINESS"
In International Shoe v. Washington,"' the United States Supreme Court
attempted to answer the question as to the kind and amount of activity
necessary to satisfy the test of "doing business." In International Shoe the
corporate defendant claimed that it could not be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of Washington within the limits of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court in this landmark decision, stated, ". . . due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'
[Emphasis added.]."' The Court found that International Shoe had estab-
lished "sufficient contacts"" with the State of Washington to cause it to be
amenable to suit in the courts of that state.
Thus, while recognizing the previous "consent" and "presence" theories,
2 4
the Supreme Court in International Shoe substituted the new due process
test of "minimum contacts."'5 The Court, however, did not prescribe any
rule of thumb as to which and how many corporate activities were neces-
sary to satisfy the test; it merely stated that the contacts in International
Shoe were "sufficient 2 1 to meet the due process requirements. The Court
did, however, state that the test was qualitative in nature as opposed to
quantitative, indicating that each case would probably have to be deter-
mined on its own facts."7
The emergence of the minimum contacts doctrine appeared to be a
significant departure from the earlier "consent" and "presence" theories,
and seemed to open new horizons to the states in securing in personam juris-
diction over non-residents. In view of the Supreme Court's failure to pre-
scribe any rule as to which contacts would satisfy the new test, many state
" Peoples Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79 (1918).
" These "drummers" were generally without power to sell, collect or extend credit or to bind
the corporation in any way but would merely solocit orders that would be accepted or rejected
by the corporation outside the state.
"°Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincey Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907).
2' 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The defendant, International Shoe, a Delaware corporation with its
principle place of business in Missouri, was held to be subject to the courts of the state of Wash-
ington where its only activity within that state was the employment of several salesmen domiciled
in Washington with authority to solicit orders for the defendant's products. The orders were
accepted or rejected by the defendant in Missouri, and goods were shipped to Washington buyers
from outside the state.
" International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
23 Id. at 320.
lId. at 317.
25 Id. at 316.
"5Id. at 320.
'
7 Id. at 319.
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legislatures took it upon themselves to do so. A multitude of new "long
arm" statutes were passed by the states most of which proscribed the type
and quantity of activity necessary to subject a foreign corporate defendant
to the jurisdiction of its courts." Among those new laws were the so-called
"one-act" or "minimum contacts" statutes.
Jurisdiction under the Minnesota Statute"0 is based upon a corporation's
participation in either of two activities: (1) The corporation entering a
contract with a resident 1 of Minnesota to be performed in whole or in part
by either party in Minnesota; and (2) a corporation committing a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota against a Minnesota resident. Under the
statute, a corporation is deemed to be doing business in Minnesota and has
impliedly consented to the appointment of the Secretary of State as its
agent to receive service of process, if it can be linked to either of the above
activities. For purposes of notice,"2 the act requires that a copy of the
process be sent to the corporation."3 Although the language of the statute
contains ghosts of the old theories, it is clearly intended to stretch the
minimum contacts doctrine to its constitutional limits.
Service of process under this type of statute is now provided for by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for actions brought in the federal courts.'
However, ". . .[t]he validity of service under such statutes depends upon
the satisfaction of two requirements. First, the act upon which the service
is predicated must be one which the state statute contemplates as a basis
for such service. Second, the nonresident defendant must have such mini-
mum contacts with the state that in personam service made upon him out-
side the forum state does not violate due process.""
A. The Minnesota Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has upheld jurisdiction obtained under
the Minnesota "one-act" statute in five principal cases. In Beck v. Spend-
ler,' decided in 1959, the court indicated that a single contact or tort
28 26 Corp. J. 75 (1970).
29See 26 Corp. J. 75, 81, 82 (1970).
30 See note 4 supra.
" A non-resident may also avail himself of the use of the statute in actions based upon con-
tract. See Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (Minn. 1964); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (Minn. 1962).
"2 There must be adequate notice given the non-resident defendant, either by mail or personal
service to satisfy due process. See J. Moore, 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 4.25 [1] (2 ed. 1967).
' Some statutes provide for direct service upon the non-resident defendant, thus dispensing
with the fiction of an implied appointment of an agent to receive service. See Ill. Rev. Stat. c.
110, § 16.17 (1967); Wisc. Stat. Ann. §§ 262.05-06 (1961); N. Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 302, 313
(McKinney 1963).
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides: "Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which
the district court is held provides ... for service of summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu
of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, . . .service may . . . be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule [Emphasis
added.]." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) provides: "Service shall be made .. .upon a .. . foreign corpora-
tion . . .by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a -managing
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process and, if such . . . if the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. . ..
[Ilt is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are [delivered] . . . in the manner prescribed
by the . . . state in which the district court is held. . . . [Emphasis added.]."
35J. Moore, 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 5 4.41-1[3] (2d ed. 1967).
so 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W. 2d 670 (1959). Plaintiff was a purchaser who sought recovery for
breach of contractual warranty. The defendant had additional contacts within the state, but the
court did not give weight to them in holding the defendant amenable to the courts of Minnesota.
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within the purview of the one-act statute, could give rise to valid in per-
sonam jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant. While noting and
approving the trend of expanding the permissible jurisdiction of state
courts over nonresident corporations, the court reiterated the "quality"
rather than "quantity" test of "minimum contacts" from International
Shoe and concluded, ". . . [i]t seems only fair to permit one who has
suffered a wrong at the hands of a resident of a foreign state to sue in his
own state ... .""
Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.38 was the first major tort case
which upheld jurisdiction procured under the "one-act" statute. The court,
in holding that the tort application of the statute was not a violation of
due process, stated that a manufacturer ". . . is liable to an ultimate user
of his product or to others who may be reasonably expected to be in the
vicinity of its probable use for injuries arising from his negligence in the
manufacture."'" The court held that even though the "tortious act" (negli-
gence) occurred outside the state, the "tort" (the wrong) occurred within
the state, as the locus of the tort is the forum where the last event (injury)
40
occurs.
In Dahlberg v. Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd.,5 the court appears
to have departed from its effort in Atkins to extend state jurisdiction to
its constitutional limits. Jurisdiction was upheld in Dahlberg, but the de-
fendant had several additional contacts with the forum and these additional
contacts appear to have been taken into consideration by the court.' In
Amedak v. Michigan Door Co.,4 however, the court reaffirmed its position
taken in Atkins. Amedak also involved contacts in addition to the one upon
which jurisdiction was asserted, but the court, relying on Atkins, held that
the injury alone would provide sufficient contact between the defendant
and the state of Minnesota and, ". . .[t]he solicitation of business in Min-
nesota, even though by mail, provides even greater contacts with [that]
state than those present in Atkins. .. ."
Ehlers v. United States Heating and Cooling Mfg. Corp.'5 is the most
far-reaching Minnesota Supreme Court decision upholding the jurisdiction
under the "one-act" statute. The court decided that, absent specific con-
trolling authority dealing with federal constitutional limitations, it would
follow the trend of its prior decisions. This decision was based upon the
"
7 Beck v. Spindler, 526 Minn. 545, 550, 99 N.W. 2d 670, 677 (1959).38258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W. 2d 888 (1960). Plaintiff was injured due to the negligent pack-
aging of a product. The foreign distributor corporation which shipped the product f.o.b. from
outside the state was held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts.
"' Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 575, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892 (1960).40 1d. at 893; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378 (1934).
4'259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 961 (1961). Action was on
an open account and notes executed, payable and delivered in Minnesota and purchased by the
non-resident defendant.
'Dahlberg v. Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd., 259 Minn. 330, 334, 107 N.W.2d 381, 385
(1961).
4 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961). Plaintiff was injured by a door negligently manu-
factured by the Michigan defendant.
" Amedek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 55, 108 N.W.2d 607, 608 (1961).
45267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963). Plaintiff sought recovery for property damage
caused by an explosion of a boiler within the state manufactured by the defendant outside of the
state. There were three successive sales of the boiler before it reached a Minnesota buyer.
[Vol. 3 6
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fact that the product ". . . involved was manufactured ... for use by the
general public . .. [and] [i]t is not contended that the area of foreseeable
use of the product was so limited as to exclude the state of Minnesota."4
This liberal view taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court in the above cases
also appears in decisions 7 under the state's other long-arm statutes.48
Jurisdiction under the Minnesota "one-act" statute was denied by the
supreme court in Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank. v. Hilson Industries,
Inc." ' There, the court found that the requisite minimum contacts were not
present. The Dahlberg"° rationale was applied here, but the opposite result
was obtained on the basis that the defendant in Hilson did not have the
additional contacts found in Dahlberg and had not enjoyed the benefit
of the laws of Minnesota." In Hilson "[t]he only connection with Minne-
sota . . . however remote . . . [was] the fact that the notes [were] payable
[there]." It appears that even conservative readings of the Beck, Atkins,
Ademek and Ehlers cases would support the proposition that the Minne-
sota Supreme Court would uphold jurisdiction under the "one-act" statute
when the corporate activity, even though establishing only a single contact
with that state, falls within one of the two categories enumerated by the
statute. The minor retreat taken in Dahlberg and the denial of jurisdiction
in Hilson can probably be distinguished by the fact that both cases dealt
with nonresident defendants who were buyers rather than sellers and it
was the Minnesota resident who was obtaining the economic benefite3 of the
transaction prior to the time of the cause of action.
Minnesota is not the only state to offer a liberal interpretation of the
minimum contacts doctrine. In the often cited case of Gray v. American
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.," the Supreme Court of Illinois held
that the manufacturer's injection of its product into the stream of com-
merce made it foreseeable that it would result in ". . . substantial use and
consumption in [that] state . . ." and the fact that the seller was not in
privity with the buyer was not determinable. Similar holdings can be found
in a multitude of jurisdictions."
'o Ehlers v. United States Heating and Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 59, 124 N.W.2d 824,
827 (1963).
41 See Danov v. ABC Freight Forwarding Corp., 266 Minn. 115, 122 N.W.2d 776 (1963);
Brooks v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, 262 Minn. 253, 114 N.W.2d 647 (1962); Paulos
v. Best Securities, Inc., 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
48 See Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 80.14(1), 540.152, 543.19 (1957).
49264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962). Defendant was a non-resident corporate buyer of
notes. The only contacts with the state was the fact that the initial solicitation took place in
Minnesota and the notes were payable in there.
50 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
"' Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Industries, Inc., 264 Minn. 110, 114, 117 N.W.2d
732, 736 (1962).
52 Id.
"aA few cases have referred to "economic benefit" as a factor to be considered in a due
process determination.
5422 Ill. 429, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 'Plaintiff was injured due to an explosion of a water
heater caused by a defective valve in that heater. Defendant foreign corporation was the manu-
facturer of the valve which was sold to a second foreign corporation and incorporated into the
water heater. Defendant's only contacts with the forum state resulted from the fact that some of
the water heaters ultimately reached Illinois consumers.
5' 176 N.E.2d 761, 776 (1961).
56 See Stephenson v. Duriron Co., 401 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1965). cert. denied. 382 U.S. 956
(1965); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966); Anderson
1970]
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The state supreme court interpretations of the minimum contacts test
are, however, not necessarily controlling over other courts within that state.
The issue of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment is a federal
question, and although the state decisions are of weight, they are not
binding upon a federal court." Any self-imposed limitations upon jurisdic-
tion by the states which go beyond the due process limitations, however,
must be observed by the federal courts sitting in those jurisdictions."
B. The Supreme Court Of The United States
The Supreme Court has set no rule other than the "minimum contacts"
doctrine of International Shoe to aid in the determination of the jurisdic-
tional limitations imposed upon the states by the due process clause. How-
ever, there have been several post International Shoe Supreme Court cases
which may lend some light to the Court's interpretation of "minimum
contacts."
In Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex. rel. State Corporation
Comm'n.," the Supreme Court reinforced the International Shoe doctrine
in the insurance area. The Court concluded that the requisite minimum
contacts were present in that case, and in making this qualitative determi-
nation mentioned several factors worthy of consideration. Among those
factors were: the interest of the forum state in requiring insurance com-
panies to faithfully perform their obligations under the policies, the incon-
venience of a policy holder in reaching the insurer elsewhere due to the
likely minimal value of the insured's claim, and also, the availability of
witnesses and evidence in the forum state."
In 1952 the Court decided Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co."
In that case it was held that so long as the corporation has the necessary
minimum contacts with the forum state, due process does not require that
the cause of action arise out of those contacts." The Court also noted that
a state may subject a foreign corporation to in personam jurisdiction to the
full extent permitted by the due process clause, but is not required to do
so." The furthest extension of jurisdiction over nonresidents approved by
the Supreme Court was in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,4
v. National Presto Industries, Inc., 135 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1965); Roche v. Floral Rental Corp.,
95 N.J. Super. 555, 232 A.2d 162 (1967) aff'd., 51 N.J. 26, 237 A.2d 265 (1968); Feathers v.
McLucas, 41 Misc. 498, 245 N.Y.S. 2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd., 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251
N.Y.S. 2d 548 (1964); Metal-Matic, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 415 P.2d 617 (Nev.
1966).
" Ark-La. Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1961); Vasser
v. Raines, 274 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied., 362 U.S. 982 (1960); Pulson v.
American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
"
8 Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1964).
59339 U.S. 643 (1950). Travelers was a Nebraska insurance corporation with about 800
"members" (policy holders) in Virginia. All business was transacted in Nebraska and new mem-
bers were obtained by recommendations from existing members. Travelers had no agents, offices
or property in Virginia. Travelers was served by registered mail for alleged violations of Virginia's
"Blue-Sky Law."
8id. at 648, 649.
61342 U.S. 437 (1952). The defendant, Philippines Mining Corporation held directors meet-
ings and kept bank accounts within the state of Ohio during World War II. Summons was served
on the president of the corporation personally at his home in Ohio.
'ald. at 446.
63 id.
64355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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where the existence of a single insurance contract with a California resi-
dent was considered sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.
Among the factors considered by the Court in reaching this decision were:
the manifest interest of California in providing an effective means of
redress for its residents; the hardship on the plaintiff as compared with that
of defendant in having to travel to a distant forum; and the availability of
witnesses in the forum state."
Had McGee been the last word by the Supreme Court on the require-
ments of due process and the meaning of "minimum contacts," it could
have meant the end of nearly all territorial limitations on jurisdiction over
nonresidents. This was not the case, however, as the next year the Court
decided Hanson v. Denkla," a case which is often cited as a limitation upon
the Court's liberal decision in McGee. Speaking on the trend of diminish-
ing the limitations of due process, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the
Hanson Court, stated:
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of
all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of the state courts .... However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant may not
be called, upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal contacts' with that
State that are prerequisite to its exercise of power over him. . . . The
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. The appli-
cation of the rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's
activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposely avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws
[Emphasis added.]."
The Court in Hanson did not overrule its decision in McGee, but merely
distinguished McGee on its facts. " The language is clear that the defendant
must perform an affirmative "act," but it is not clear whether that act can
be performed outside, but having an effect within, the state, or whether
the "act" must be performed totally within the state. It appears, however,
that the former may be sufficient to meet the Hanson test."
The effect of International Shoe and subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sions have reduced the due process limitations of personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants. But, the extent to which these requirements have
been diminished is not yet clear. The Court has stated that each case must
be decided upon its own facts, ' but has offered no formula by which this
determination can be made. However, it may be possible to extract some
general guidelines from its decisions. The Court has seemingly "... . set up
a dual test for determining whether a court may take jurisdiction without
65 Id. at 224.
66 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The defendant Delaware Trust Company's sole contact with the forum
state (Florida) was due to the fact that it had been named trustee of the decedent's estate prior to
the decedent's becoming a resident of Florida.6 1d. at 251, 253.
68 Id. at 250, 252, 253.
6' Due Process and Foreign Corporations-The Milwaukee Single Act Statute, 50 Minn. L. Rev.
946, 951 (1966).
70 Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
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depriving a defendant of due process of law. The first requirement is that
there must be some minimum contact with the state that results from an
affirmative act of the defendant . . . [and] . . . in addition . . . it must be
fair and reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and
defend the action." 1 It remains to be seen just how well the lower federal
courts will observe those guidelines."
C. The Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has decided at least four cases" dealing with the due
process question under consideration. The most recent of those decisions
was Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company,"4 decided in 1965. In Aftanase
the Court thoroughly examined the Minnesota Supreme Court decisions
on the subject and concluded that although these decisions were of weight,
they were not binding upon the federal court in the determination of a
federal question.2 The court also noted considerable conflict among the
Minnesota federal district court decisions involving the Minnesota "one-
act" statute." In light of this disparity, the Aftanase court set out to ex-
amine the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions on the issue
and extracted their own set of guidelines from those cases.77 The court
noted five major factors to be considered in the determination of whether
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident comports with due process.
These factors were: (1) The quantity of the contacts; (2) the nature and
quality of the contacts; (3) the source and connection of the cause of
action with these contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state; and (5)
convenience."' The primary factors to be considered were numbers one
through three, while four and five should receive lesser attention." Al-
though no attempt was made to indicate the number of factors that must
71J. Moore, 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 5 4.25[5] (2d ed. 1967).
7 2 See Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); W. H. Elliot & Sons
Co. v. Nuodex Products Co., 243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957); Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co.,
249 F. Supp. I (W. D. Va. 1965); Nationwide Motorist Ass'n of Michigan, Inc. v. Nationwide
Motorist Ass'n, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 490 (W. D. Mich. 1965).
71 See Simkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1964); Jennings v. McCall Corp.,
320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197
(8th Cir. 1961).
74343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965). Defendant's only contacts with the forum state resulted
from the fact that it sold products to residents of Minnesota upon receipt of orders solicited by
independent salesmen and sold replacement parts to the Minnesota purchasers. These contacts were
sufficient.
75 id. at 191.
"See Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964); Thiele Eng'r. Co. v. Weldon
Farm Products, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 809 (Minn. 1963); Penzimas v. Eastern Metal Products Corp.,
218 F. Supp. 524 (Minn. 1961); Dahlberg Co. v. American Sound Products, Inc., 179 F. Supp.
928 (Minn. 1959); Mueller v. Steelcase Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (Minn. 1959); Bard v. Bemidii
Bottle Gas Co., 23 F.R.D. 299 (Minn. 1958) quashing service under the one act statute as being
violative of due process. But see United Barge Co. v. Logan Charter Service, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624
(Minn. 1964); Haldeman-Homme Mfg. Co. v. Texacon Industries, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 99 (Minn.
1964); Carlson v. Chatfield Mach. Co., 228 F. Supp. 162 (D. Minn. 1964); Ewing v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (Minn. 1962); Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons 'Press Sales, Inc., 188
F. Supp. 876 (Minn. 1960); McMenomy v. Wonder Bldg. Corp. of America, 188 F. Supp. 213
(Minn. 1960) upholding service.
"7International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Travelers Health Insurance
Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437
(1952); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
735 (1958).78 Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
79 id.
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weigh in favor of "fair play and substantial justice"80 to be consistent with
due process, that number is probably less than five.81 The Aftanase court
was not confronted with the true "one-act" or "isolated instance" situation,
and since jurisdiction was upheld in that case, it is obvious that Aftanase
is'not the last word on due process limitations under the Minnesota "one-
act" statute.
III. THE ISOLATED INSTANCE-UPPGREN v. EXECUTIVE AVIATION
SERVICES, INC.8
Uppgren was a true single act situation. The only contacts" that defend-
ant Loving Chevrolet had with Minnesota was ". . . the fortuitous circum-
stance of injury within . . .," the borders of Minnesota caused by the
allegedly defective helicopter it sold to the United States. Upon this prem-
ise the court stated that ". . . it is incumbent upon the court to scrutinize
the facts closely to insure the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant is consistent with due process" [Emphasis added.]." And they
proceeded to do just that. Two main issues were immediately formulated:
(1) Does the Minnesota statute, as construed by the courts of that state,
subject the defendant to in personam jurisdiction under the circumstances
of the case? And (2) ". . . if the forum has attempted to exercise in per-
sonam jurisdiction, does such action comport with the due process require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution?""8
With respect to the first issue, the Minnesota "one act" statute"7 requires
that the tort be committed ". . in whole or in part in Minnesota .. .,,8
The court readily conceded that the injury did comprise at least part of the
tort, and thus, the action was one contemplated by the statute. This rea-
soning was supported by the court's examination of the Atkins and Eblers
cases.8 The Court summarized:
Thus according to the Minnesota Supreme Court if a Minnesota resident is
injured in Minnesota, the "one-act" statute applies without any further
showing ..."
The Uppgren court then disposed of a theory supporting jurisdiction as
asserted by the plaintiff. It was argued that the Illinois Supreme Court case
of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp." was applicable
here, and the ... single fact that the product sold by Loving was present
in Minnesota and caused injury therein... was sufficient to confer juris-
8
"International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
81Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965).
82 304 F. Supp. 165 (Minn. 1969).
" See text accompanying note S supra.
84 Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 167 (Minn. 1969).
85 Id.
88 Id., Aftanase v. Economy Baler Company, 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Con-
nolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (Minn. 1964); J. Moore, 2 Moore's Federal Practice, 5 4.41-1[3] (2d ed.
1965).
"
7Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(1), (3) (1957).
88 Id.
88 See notes 38 and 45 supra.
9eUppgran v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 168 (Minn. 1969).
91 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
'" Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 169 (Minn. 1969).
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diction consistent with due process. However, the court distinguished the
Gray case on the basis that the defendant in Gray was a mass producer and
should have reasonably foreseen that its product could ". . . come to rest in
a particular state or perhaps many states. .."" This was not the case with
Loving." The court further pointed out that, in the "foreseeability test"
as expounded by Gray, the assumption of "foreseeability" is contingent
upon the substantial" use and consumption of the product within the state,
and concluded:
In the instant case, however, though Loving might reasonably foresee use of
its product in interstate commerce, it is doubtful that it could foresee sub-
stantial use within the state of Minnesota."
The mere presence of a product within a jurisdiction, and its cause of
injury therein ". . . in the absence of any additional facts . . ."" would
make the defendant "amenable per se" to the courts of that state and could
produce consequences which offend "... the 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' ""
Turning to the question of due process, the Uppgren court looked di-
rectly to Af tanase for guidance and proceeded to apply the five factors set
forth in Aftanase to the instant case. (1) The quantity of the contacts. In
Uppgren, the only contact with the forum state was the fact that the
product caused injury there. The court did not comment upon the weight
of this factor, but it was not considered to be favorable to the plaintiff. On
the other hand, under the rationale of McGee9' this factor is not necessarily
detrimental to the plaintiff's argument if the contract has a substantial
connection with the forum state.
(2) The nature and quality of the contacts. With respect to this factor,
the court stated that, ". . . Loving engaged in no 'voluntary affirmative
economic activity of substance' vis d vis the plaintiff or the State of Min-
nesota. The fact of injury was completely fortuitous .... the presence of
the defective product .. .was an isolated instance .. .[i]t cannot be said
that the Loving commercial helicopter business resulted in substantial use
and consumption of defendant's products in Minnesota .. .and Loving has
[not] benefited .. .from Minnesota law . . ."' In light of the court's pre-
93 Id.
"' "Though the court has no direct evidence as to the number of helicopters sold by defendant
during the period 1965-1967, it is reasonable to assume that the number could not have been
large. The product is expensive and supply and demand is limited. Under these circumstances, the
use of the alleged defective product in Minnesota was an 'isolated instance,' even conceding the
mobile nature of the product." Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165,
169 (D. Minn. 1969).
95 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 776 (1961).
9'Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170 (Minn. 1969).
' The additional facts necessary to change the mind of this court would be that ". . . the
product is mass produced and in extensive commercial use in the forum state . . . defendant
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in that state . .. [or] expects or should
reasonably expect that his conduct will have consequences in the state . . . and . . . derives sub-
stantial revenue from interstate or international commerce." Uppgren v. Executive Aviation
Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 170 (Minn. 1969).
98 Id.
"McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
"' Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 171 (Minn. 1969).
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vious mention of the few helicopters sold by the defendant, it is submitted
that the use of one of them within the State of Minnesota could be con-
sidered a substantial use of the defendant's products in the forum state.
Moreover, in light of the court's mention of the high cost of the product,
it can be argued that Loving received a substantial economic benefit from
that sale. Finally, concerning the fact that the product was of such a mo-
bile nature and was sold to the United States Department of Interior, it is
unlikely that the defendant could foresee its use exclusively in Washing-
ton, D.C."1 or Maryland, and that the defendant could not specifically
exclude"'2 Minnesota as a probable place of use of its product. However,
it could be argued that the fact that it was the plaintiff's employer who
brought the defendant's product into Minnesota was a "unilateral" act of
the type condemned by the Supreme Court in Hanson.'
(3) The source and connection of the cause of action with these con-
tacts. The court states that "... . [t]he only connection ... is the fortuitous
circumstance of presence of the alleged defective product in the state caus-
ing injury to the plaintiff within the state." [Emphasis added.]."' The
United States Supreme Court did not demand a direct connection in
Perkins,"1 however, in the case of a single contact it appears that a direct
connection would be required."°1 In the instant case, what could be more
direct than the plaintiff's decedent's death from the crash of the defend-
ant's product?
(4) The interest of the forum state. The court conceded that Minnesota
did have an interest in providing a forum for any injured resident, but
declared that this interest alone is not controlling. It might be argued, how-
ever, that Minnesota has as great an interest in protecting its residents
from defective products as California had in McGee. ""
(5) The convenience of the parties. The court states that this factor
.. militates against the maintenance of the suit in Minnesota, having in
mind that defendant is situated many, many miles away and that its rec-
ords, witnesses and office is in Maryland, although it is recognized that
plaintiff undoubtedly will have some witnesses in Minnesota."'0 0 Today,
this factor is not of great importance because ". . . progress in communica-
tions and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tri-
bunal less burdensome."'1" However, this factor would appear to advocate
a more convenient trial in Minnesota where the cause of action occurred.
Although defendant may have records and witnesses in Maryland, the
plaintiff has the remains of the helicopter in Minnesota. The wreckage
would probably need to be thoroughly examined by expert witnesses repre-
'0' See note 1 supra.
102 See note 37 supra.
"Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
"0 Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 171 (Minn. 1969).
101 Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952).
10oJ. Moore 2, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 5 4.25[5] (2 ed. 1967).
"McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
100 Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 171 (Minn. 1969).
"Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
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senting both parties. The records appear to be the easier of the two to
move.
Thus, the court in Uppgren reasoned that only one of the five factors
examined tended to favor their sustaining jurisdiction. It is submitted that
all five, with the possible exception of the second under the Hanson ra-
tionale, could have been construed to show that due process was being
afforded. This should, to some extent, exemplify the difficulty in applica-
tion of any sort of mechanical rule, even one so flexible as that found in
the Aftanase case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decisions, viewed as a whole, take a seemingly liberal
view of the requirements of due process, with Hanson v. Denckla being
the only possible limitation. The fact that Uppgren appears to be a limi-
tation upon the Minnesota statute is by no means conclusive. The factors
examined by the Uppgren court may be the relevant issues in such a
determination, but it is not exactly clear whether the meaning and weight
given to each of the factors by the Uppgren court would be identical with
those that the Supreme Court would assign."' Even though the Hanson
v. Denckla court required a positive act on the part of the defendant as a
requisite of due process, that court did not state what sort of affirmative
act is necessary. It could possibly be argued that even the interjection of
products into the stream of commerce, as in the Gray v. American Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp. could be an affirmative act within the meaning
of Hanson.
As aforesaid, the Aftanase court merely provided the relevant factors
to be examined in a due process determination. These factors were ex-
tracted from the relevant Supreme Court cases dealing with the minimum
contacts doctrine. But, the Fifth Circuit in Aftanase refused to make any
prediction of the result that would follow any given application of the
cited factors. However, it appears that at least one author has taken up
where Aftanase left off and has postulated the following results from any
of four given fact situations:
[1] If there are substantial contacts with the state, for example a sub-
stantial and continuing business, and if the cause of action arises of the
business done in the state, jurisdiction will be sustained. [2] If there are
substantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action does not arise
out of these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. [3] If there is a
minimum of contacts, and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it
will normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. [4] If there is
a minimum of contacts and the cause of action does not arise out of the
contacts, there will normally be no basis of jurisdiction, since it is difficult
to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and reasonable test."'
110 See Karland, The Supreme Court and the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 623 (1958).
...J. Moore, 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 5 4.25[5] (2 ed. 1967).
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The Uppgren fact situation would fall within the third category where
it would "normally be fair and reasonable to sustain jurisdiction." Thus,
under the analysis above, it appears that the Uppgren court could have
sustained jurisdiction in that case and should have done so in light of
Minnesota's expressed desire to extend in personam jurisdiction over non-
residents to the limits of due process. However, it must again be noted
that the validity of any such result-predicting analysis cannot remain un-
questioned until the ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Hanson case are made clear.
Gary William Westerberg
